Mono Jojoy Meets His Maker

Top FARC military commander and member of the directorate whose nom de guerre was Mono Jojoy a/k/a Jorge Brice~o, was killed in Colombia by the military after a concerted effort of several years to contain and isolate his command.

He literally grew up with the FARC. He was raised among the backwoods Stalinist bands that split from the Liberal Party rural guerillas of the Violencia period. Jacobo Arenas, the FARC's top ideologue and strategist, knew him from childhood, and became a life-long mentor and booster. Besides Communist indoctrination, a teenaged Mono Jojoy received plenty of on-the-job training as a guerilla fighter. By the 80's he had risen through the ranks to commmand large formations. Eventually he led the powerful East Front (Bloque Oriental) for years, Mono Jojoy was known as a top battlefield commander who in the 90's delivered strong blows to Colombia's military.

 

 

During the Zona De Despeje/Cease Fire period, he was all over the press and television, roaming around in a 4x4 with a posse that included many female guerillas.

In a country that has produced legendary (and telegenic) sociopaths like Pablo Escobar and Carlos Castano, Jojoy is right up there. He was a ruthless killer who ordered terror killings and kidnappings of thousands of Colombians. He was up to his neck in the drug racket the FARC ran, as well as their policy of keeping military and civilian hostages. Basically, he bears a lot of blame in the FARC's crimes of the past 30 years that have extended the conflict and ungovernability in Colombia

His death is a blow to the FARC. Directorate members - once considered invulnerable- have died like flies since 2007. Jojoy's reputation of a top commander leading the strongest guerilla columns will be extremely demoralizing to rank and file guerillas as well as middle and top leaders.

The noose also tightens on Cano, and the other directorate members. They have nothing to bargain with.

South America - State Oil Companies While Colombia has record production, Bolivia and Venezuela are a Mess

Colombia's State Oil Company Ecopetrol is exporting record amounts of crude this year.

Bolivia's State Oil Company, YPFB after 4 years of Evo has turned Bolivia from being self-sufficient in most fuels and natural gas products, into a country that imports gasoline (even from Chile!) and liquefied petroleum gas (from Peru).   Gas production is static, despite the record prices and South American demand.    In 1999 there were 65 wells drilled in Bolivia, in 2009 there were 3 (three.)    Four years of government has meant six different CEO's for Bolivia's National Oil Company.  One of the exes is in jail, result of the worst scandal in YPFB company history last year.

Venezuela's PDVSA - once the flagship State Oil Company in the region, is producing a million less barrels of oil per day than it did in the 90's, it is a mismanaged mess, that is deeply in debt. 


Reason:  Colombia has a sensible hydrocarbons policy, in which the State plays an active role, while also allowing foreign participation and investment.   Bolivia and Venezuela do not - in many cases directly due to conscious policies in the last four years that reversed the modernization reforms of the 90's. 

Colombia, laws and regulations, modified in 2004, provide a comprehensive framework for the hydrocarbons sector.  Centuries of obsessiveness with the language finally pay off  in areas other than Magical Realist novels, as the carefully drafted legislation seems pretty clear and comprehensive.  Starting with the Constitution and the relevant legislation, the Country's laws set out clearly delimited areas of responsibility and accountability for all actors in the energy sector. The Ministry of Mines is responsible overall for the extractive industries, the Unit for Mining and Energy Planning (UPME) is responsible for research and planning future energy needs,  a unit of the Ministry of Mines, the ANH  administers the hydrocarbons sector - both private and state companies,  the regulatory agency  CREQ regulates the energy market of which natural gas is a part.  The National Oil Company, Ecopetrol, is the leading oil company in the country.

Ecopetrol unlike YPFB or PDVSA,  is not granted a monopoly on production, and is expected to be another competitor in the market..   To make sure it is competitive under this scheme, Colombian legislation ensures Ecopetrol has managerial autonomy, follow standard corporate rules and procedures, and pretty much operates as a modern international hydrocarbons company.    And to raise investment funds, it adopted a novel scheme.  it raised capital through stock offerings,  selling 20% of its shares in offerings in which Colombian citizens had first-right to buy, and there was a monetary and percentage cap as to how much any one individual could buy, to ensure national and "democratically" distributed ownership.   With this financing it has begun an ambitious cycle of investments that will boost Colombia;s coffers.

As part of its plan to increase investment and expand the industry, Colombian law allows private and foreign companies of all sizes to participate in the upstream and downstream part of the hydrocarbons business, either individually or as partner with Ecopetrol.   Colombia's current legal system, has laws that protect private investment.     As a result of this security foreign investment  in hyrdrocarbons has soared,  exceeding  3.5 Billion dollars a year for the past couple of years.

Drill Evo Drill

On the other hand, Bolivia's newly Nationalized Oil and Gas sector is arguably less transparent than it has been in the last 15 years.   Evo got rid of the somewhat competent independent regulatory agency that  "neoliberal" governments had set up, placing those responsibilities within the same ministerial bureaucracy.    Instead of openly soliciting bids for joint ventures or other projects, the government in past years has enacted decrees unilaterally picking partners and setting up ventures with foreign companies with little oversight.and questionable legality.  To make matter worse, the management of  the State Oil Company YPFB, starting right from the Morales governments inaguration has been politicized and de-professionalized, with corruption scandals of all sorts and incompetent decisionmaking and planning.  This sorry state of affairs has succeeded in stalled production.
 
While Venezuela at least on paper allows for foreign participation, Evo's Bolivia has policies described by one analyst as "tougher than Cuba's", limits all activities related to hydrocarbons exploration, production, and commercialization to YPFB, though it can sign limited contracts with outside companies.  But even these service contracts are in a sort of legal limbo due to the inconsistencies - and outright confusion- in the new Constitution.  As a practical matter,  the decrees, laws passed since 2005, and the new Constitution do not provide a comprehensive set of rules of the game, to put it simply.   It is hard for the players in the Bolivian hydrocarbons sector to know where they stand, and that is true even for the State!  Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz is probably spinning in his grave.    Small wonder that investment by foreign companies in Bolivia have dropped dramatically.    Forget harsh government rhetoric, having a Constitution that when it is not being stridently anti-capitalist  is confusing and vague when talking about  the extent of the States right to contract over resource rights, to private property rights and protection of investments,  does not seem like a good place to invest in.

Venezuela and Bolivia's have followed a failed statitst model,  For all the talk about Bolivia's "democracy from below" in the words of Evo apologist Jim Schultz, its so-called alternative to "neoliberalism" is bankrupt at its core.

The key here is that countries like Colombia that are doing well,  and are doing so outside of the stereotype of the neoliberal/washington consensus/imf bogeyman..   Ecopetrol is a nationally-owned State Company like Yacimientos or PDVSA.  But Colombia has built a framework that allows its State-owned company to thrive, while allowing foreign companies with their technology and know-how to actively participate in exploration and production of hyrdrocarbons.  This may not be the best system out there, but at least it ensures Colombias public coffers grow, and the industry longs well poised in the long-run.     Bolivia, sadly, seems to prefer to imitate the State Oil Company in Venezuela, instead of the one that works in Colombia.

Mexican Drug Violence - 12 Myths

Of all people! Joaquin Villalobos - as in ex-FMLN battlefield commander - has an interesting take on the drug cartel violence in Mexico. In Number #2 of his "12 Myths" he takes a look at the claim that "Mexico's conflict is becoming Colombianized, and Mexico is close to being a Failed State". He places Mexico's current violence in perspective, by using Colombia's last two decades of narco-violence for comparison. And, he also looking at the violence in major Latin American cities -

México sufre una violencia localizada en seis de sus 32 estados y tiene una tasa nacional de 10 homicidios por cada 100 mil habitantes. Venezuela tiene 48, Colombia 37, Brasil 25, Guatemala, Honduras y El Salvador están arriba de 50. El estado de Chihuahua, el más violento de México, está en este momento en su punto más álgido con una tasa de 143 homicidios, le siguen Sinaloa con 80, Durango con 49, Baja California 44 y Michoacán 25. A inicios de los noventa Medellín, la ciudad más violenta de Colombia, mantuvo una tasa de 320 durante varios años y, en ese mismo periodo, Cali tenía 124, Cúcuta 105 y Bogotá, la capital, 80. Colombia ha vivido dos guerras en 25 años, las cuales le han costado más de 200 mil muertos y dos millones de desplazados, y continúa en conflicto.

Translation summary - As a country, Mexico has 10 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, compared to Venezuela 48, Colombia 37, Brasil 25. Mexico's neighbor Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras all average over 50.

Mexico's violence is pretty much "localized" in 6 of 32 States. Murder rates in the most violent state Chihahua - 143 per 100,000, Sinaloa -80, Durango 49, Baja California 44, Michoacan -25. 4 Mexican States in the middle of the drug war have rates comparable to countries like Venezuela or Colombia.

At the peak of the Medellin Cartel violence in the early 90's, Medellin "kept a rate of 320 (deaths per 100,000) for several years". Cali following with 124, Bogota had 80. Colombia "which continues in conflict", has "lived two wars in 24 years, costing more than 200,000 dead and two million displaced." But still, Medellin's grim statistics are a valid comparison to the likes of Ciudad Juarez, because the city was the home base for a ruthless cartel, led by capos like Escobar and Lehder, who waged war on the Colombian State, battled rival cartels, had a strangelhold over local authorities.

El volumen, extensión, raíces históricas, códigos culturales y complejidad de la violencia colombiana ha sido —y todavía es— muy superior a la que vive México. En Colombia los niveles de penetración que alcanzó el narcotráfico en la política, el ejército, la policía, los negocios y la sociedad fueron mayores a los que existen actualmente en México, donde no se puede hablar de una narcopolítica. Los cárteles y narcoguerrillas colombianas golpearon con actos terroristas a personajes e instituciones de los poderes políticos, económicos y mediáticos vitales del país. En 1989 Luis Carlos Galán, candidato a la presidencia, fue asesinado por el narcotráfico y tres candidatos más fueron asesinados en ese periodo. El propio presidente, Álvaro Uribe, ha sobrevivido a varios atentados y el vicepresidente, Francisco Santos, estuvo secuestrado por Pablo Escobar. Hechos como éstos no han ocurrido y es muy difícil que ocurran en México, donde no han existido territorios con ausencia de Estado durante 40 años como en Colombia; el Estado mexicano ha sido más bien omnipresente y fuerte y el colombiano ausente y débil.

As Villalobo's points out, Colombia's conflict was more multi-layered and complex than what is happening in Mexico. It involved many more actors and factions, and a long historical context that is lacking in Mexico.

Mexico City and other urban areas like Guadalajara have largely escaped the conflict. the drug-fueled violence in Colombia on the other hand, reached the centers of power in Bogota. Top rungs of the judiciary, political class, media, police and army were objects of a terror campaign by the cartel. Were the Zetas or others doing to Mexico what the Medellin Cartel did to Colombia, Mexico City would be in a State of Siege with car bombs going off against Federal buildings.

One other key point that the author makes is that Mexico's State presence, overall, is much stronger than Colombia's. The Colombian conflict has always had a territorial aspect to it: the lack of a strong state presence in vast swaths of the territory where illegal activities take place. Mexico's PRI created a fairly strong state presence everywhere, and even under democratization, Mexico's State presence is fairly vigorous in most of the country.
In another essay also in Nexos, he explores some of these issues further.

He sees Mexican media and opinion acting as if they were in a vacuum, failing to place the violence in a comparative, regional perspective. When presented this way, there is an over-emphasis on what is wrong - as well as what appears to be going wrong - over more measured analysis.

Bolivia: Coca Es Mostly Cocaina.....Cocaine Production Up In Bolivia & Peru Down in Colombia

According to Reuters

LIMA (Reuters) - Cocaine production is growing fastest in Bolivia while Peru is on its way to matching output from Colombia, the top global producer of the drug, U.N. officials said on Friday.

Coca plant cultivation in Bolivia, which expelled U.S. anti-drug agents last year after accusing them of meddling in domestic affairs, grew 6 percent in 2008, according to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime's annual study of Andean nations.

Estimated cocaine production rose 9 percent to 113 metric tons in the impoverished South American nation.

This is what happens when you leave the fox in charge of the henhouse. The reality that Evo-pologists avoid or ignore is that Morales's main base of support is composed of people who grow coca that is almost exclusively used to make cocaine. They want to be able to avoid annoyances like the DEA so they can grow coca freely so they can sell it or make their own coca paste. So now it is easier to do such things as bribe cops/military people without the "gringos" there, and there is less incentive to do anything about it.

EDIT

Meanwhile, the UN also found that production also increased in Peru, part which can be attributed to neo-Sendero Luminoso types. Meanwhile growing of coca and production of cocaine actually fell in Colombia. Part of this might have to do with successes against the FARC, who both directly control some of the production and export as well as critical smuggling routes. And also moving against top Paramilitary leaders, who often acted with semi-sanction from officials because they fought the FARC. Critical in the Colombian conflict(s) and efforts against traffickers is territory. The more space in control or disputed by non-governmental armed bands, the more space that could be used to grow and produce cocaine. In a larger sense the conflicts with the guerillas also acted as a buffer against government actions against all parties dealing cocaine. Taking those players out of the equation allowed both direct erradication - as well as for traditional law enforcement to work against drug dealer.

DAYUM!!!: BETANCOURT ....US HOSTAGES FREED

way hot off the presses. The FARC's biggest captives were apparently freed in one major millitary operation - if this is for real, it will go on record as being one of the most impressive hostage rescues in history. These people were seized and held by some of the most ruthless, sophisticated, well-armed, kidnappers ever seen.

this will be a deathblow to the FARC. They just lost their best negotiating chips.

By FRANK BAJAK, Associated Press Writer 17 minutes ago

BOGOTA, Colombia - Colombian spies tricked leftist rebels into handing over kidnapped presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three U.S. military contractors Wednesday in a daring helicopter rescue so successful that not a single shot was fired.
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Betancourt, who was seized on the campaign trail six long years ago, appeared thin but healthy as she strode down the stairs of a military plane and held her mother in a long embrace.

"Thank you for your impeccable operation," she told top military commanders. "The operation was perfect."

Eleven Colombian police and soldiers were also freed in the rescue, the most serious blow ever dealt to the 44-year-old Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, which considered the four hostages their most valuable bargaining chips. The FARC is already reeling from the deaths of key commanders a

nd the loss of much of the territory it once held.

Bolivia, Colombia: FARC Laptop: Evo, Ortega to Meet Marulanda at Summit

The laptops which allegedly were captured from the FARC camp are an interesting read. Colombian publication Semana has some n Interesting highlights. In general, it is a lot of back and forth correspondence among top levels of the FARC hierarchy, as would be expected from a member of the directorate charged with foreign affairs.
There is also quite a bit of chatter - almost obsessive - on their business dealings. They try to figure out how best to use money from Chavez - the $300 million the press talks about. In my opinion it could be Chavez granting them a contract to commercialize the $300 million worth of oil, from which they would get a huge commission, and could launder it through front corporations. Only in Colombia would Marxist-leninists have this kind of business savvy. The Uranium, sounds like a proposal one of their "contacts" made. When you have this kind of cash, people will try to sell you anything
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Then you get to the heart of the matter of the matter. There is a lot of internal strategizing and debate between FARC commanders about how to effectively use their bargaining position with the hostages, to get international recognition as combatants, the "despeje" or "cleared zone" to further peace negotiations. And throughout its clear that they see Chavez as a key partner, even flattering his vanity. But definitively someone who can help them in undermining Uribe internationally, by upstaging him in these hostage dealings - and consequently strengthening the FARC's position internally.

"PATRIA O MUERTE" EVO
Evo, Ortega and Correa are described as being close to Chavez: the FARC commander emailing Marulanda/Tirofijo describes them as "patria o muerte" with Chavez "fatherland or death" literally.
Marulanda, the ancient and enigmatic leader of the FARC, who has been in the bush most of his adult life, will apparently have a meeting with Chavez. The Venezuelan will be accompanied by Evo, Daniel Ortega and Correa, in what is described as a "summit of commanders".
Here is a quote from that communication.

Octubre, 4 de 2007
Camarada Manuel. Cordial saludo. Del diálogo con Chacín, lo siguiente:

1- Se proseguirá el esfuerzo por hacer realidad la cumbre de comandantes en el Yarí. De lograrse, Chávez iría acompañado por los presidentes Ortega, Evo y Correa, que son “patria o muerte” con Chávez. De todas maneras habrá una reunión privada Chávez-Marulanda. "

No doubt many discussions of Boliviarian projects, complaints about the empire and comparing notes on coca production.

-As an aside, I was struck by the ideological common ground between Evo, Garcia-Linera, the MAS leadership and the FARC. Their worldview, an extremely paranoid and rigid view of the empire, and its domestic "oligarchic" partners. The delusions they somehow have a "valid revolutionary alternative" - nothing more than the same old Marxist-Leninist cliches, with some twists.

Another letter, describes the topics that will be brought up by these characters. The negotiations with the Colombian government, and a "common geo-political strategy".

3- Ya estoy enterando a Ricardo y a Marcos de todos los pormenores. Los dos camaradas serán recibidos públicamente por Chávez antes de su reunión del 12 con Uribe en la frontera de la Guajira. Esperamos nuevas directrices del camarada Manuel. Por ahora les he explicado que su misión es reiterar a nombre del Secretariado lan exigencia de despeje de Pradera y Florida. Agradecer a Chávez su invaluable labor de intermediación. Que la cumbre Chávez-Marulanda en el Yarí con el acompañamiento de los presidentes Ortega, Morales y Correa, será decisiva en la búsqueda de fórmulas para el acuerdo y para la estrategia geopolítica común. Plantear que estamos analizando sus propuestas de fecha para la reunión secreta con el Secretariado. Convocar a los gobiernos del mundo, personalidades y organizaciones políticas y sociales a rodear la intermediación del Presidente Chávez.

The FARC clearly sees Evo and Ortega as part of this "Boliviarian" anti-US block, that wants to weaken Colombia's government, decrease US influence, and build up Chavez. The FARC want legitimacy as combatants, the clearing of a "demilitarized zone" within Colombia while negotiations for their release and an eventual peace plan take place. They want to discredit and hurt Uribe as much as possible in the meantime. Externally, that means giving Chavez - and partners Evo, Ortega, Correa - leverage by showing they can be effective intermediaries with the FARC by releasing hostages. Evo and Correa can also contact influential countries on behalf of these "efforts", without carrying the Chavez stigma (in theory).

In some ways this is nothing more than the FARC giving a percentage of its future earnings to partners like Chavez - and Evo to a lesser degree. Those earnings, are of course, the ransom for the hundreds they kidnapped and hold hostage for years. This is an ugly situation.
Judge for yourself, the 36 page PDF made available by Colombia.

Colombia: FARC #2 KILLED, CHAVEZ CRIES,

Tirofijo's son in law gets his, a kilometer inside Ecuador.

Around 8 years ago, Raul Reyes was constantly on Colombian and International TV during the failed negotiations between FARC and the Colombian government, and was the public face of the FARC. Was a ruthless hardline communist trained in East Germany. As commander of the "Bloque Sur" he ordered thousands of kidnapings, hundreds of extra-judicial executions.

He was up to his neck in responsibility for the crimes of FARC, not only from the command side, but because he handled the groups finances>.
And he was also the pervert who kidnapped 9 year girls to become part of his harem.
=
Chavez comments & actions are inflamatory, revealing, and crazy:

i. A minute of silence for Reyes
ii. Admitted he met 3 times with Reyes, even before president.
iii. Said it was "tribute" to "Raul Reyes a real revolutionary"
iv. says the killing was "not in combat", a "cowardly murder" "coldly planned"
v. Called Colombia a "terrorist state", says Uribe is the "criminal", a "liar" a "terrorist",

Correa meanwhile is the real "aggrieved party" since Ecuadorian sovereignity was violated. But information found on Reyes laptop allegedly shows that Reyes was meeting with Ecuadors government. Correa was negotiating with FARC to recognize them as combatants in order to get involved in hostage negotiations, to probably gain some leverage over Colombia. Apparently Correa was willing to pull more anti-FARC elements in police and military from border. Ecuador's president could come across really, really bad. In the process justifying Uribe not notifiying him.

Tip Of The Hat to
Boz

COLOMBIA: FARC Treatment of Baby Emanuel

Unaceptable

The FARC are worse than criminals....the Miami Herald fills the gaps in the case of baby Emanuel: "born in a FARC jungle camp to one-time vice presidential candidate Clara Rojas, kidnapped by the rebels along with presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt nearly six years ago during a campaign trip to a rural area. The father was reported to be a rebel who had a consensual relationship with Rojas."
The child was handed off by the guerrillas to a resident:

In early June 2005, José Crisanto Gómez, a 37-year-old peasant, arrived here by boat after a one-day trip from his tiny village of La Paz, according to several residents. La Paz was then under the control of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a leftist guerrilla group better known as FARC.

Gómez arrived with two sickly children, seeking medical care for them. One, a boy of about 11 months, had what medical personnel here described as one of the worst health profiles they had seen: malaria, a broken arm, severe malnutrition, anemia, a high fever, diarrhea and leishmaniasis, a serious skin disease common in the jungle.

`IT WAS DEPRESSING'

The public clinic here immediately transferred him to the hospital in the provincial capital, San José del Guaviare, only 17 miles but a 40-minute drive away.
The public clinic here immediately transferred him to the hospital in the provincial capital, San José del Guaviare, only 17 miles but a 40-minute drive away.

''It is not common to receive children in the [bad] health that Juan David arrived,'' said Rosario Neira, director of the San José hospital. ``It was depressing, everything that had come together on just one child. It made for sadness.''

''Anyone would have fallen apart before this child, with so many diseases,'' she added. ``He didn't raise his eyes. He got toys but did not pick them up. He did not stand but dragged himself on his butt. He cried but no tears came because of the malnutrition.''

Given what is now known about the boy, his poor health is not surprising.

In criminal court I have seen thiefs, drug dealers, even murderers who behaved with more basic decency towards "civilians". With all their dope money the FARC did not have the decency to provide the man with money to look after the kid properly. Self-styled revolutionaries are supposed to know the political and monetary value of keeping their "star" captives - and their kids- alive. Even the most hardened gangster knows a hostages kid, is money in the bank, and out of self-interest would at least look after him. They deserve no mercy.


Tip Of The Hat to
Boz